Nice thread!

Here's my little contribution: the outcome of Midway was determined by luck, a missed sighting, and Nagumo's decision to re-arm his planes. Actually, flawed IJN strategy and tactical doctrine foretold the outcome...

This book will turn much of what you knew about Midway in its head. It's a great read!

Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway Paperback – Nov 1 2007

by Parshall and Tully

Does it go into the difference in US and Japanese carrier doctrine, and the ways in which the physical designs of the carriers gave the US ships an advantage in refuel/rearm times for their fighters?

Actually, flawed IJN strategy and tactical doctrine foretold the outcome...

Of the war, probably, but not necessarily for Midway. Tone's scout launching half an hour late (delaying finding the Americans) and the pure dumb luck of the Yorktown and Enterprise SBDs finding the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu when they did (fighters chasing the last TBDs, decks packed with strike two) are what I usually cite as the two deciding factors of the Battle, coupled with the work of Joe Rochefort's codebreaking crew beforehand.

Actually, flawed IJN strategy and tactical doctrine foretold the outcome...

Of the war, probably, but not necessarily for Midway. Tone's scout launching half an hour late (delaying finding the Americans) and the pure dumb luck of the Yorktown and Enterprise SBDs finding the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu when they did (fighters chasing the last TBDs, decks packed with strike two) are what I usually cite as the two deciding factors of the Battle, coupled with the work of Joe Rochefort's codebreaking crew beforehand.

Gotta love 'em SBDs. After all, the Y-wing is based off of them.

Does it go into the difference in US and Japanese carrier doctrine, and the ways in which the physical designs of the carriers gave the US ships an advantage in refuel/rearm times for their fighters?

Yes, absolutely. It's fascinaing to read about IJN doctrine, which hasn't really been covered in such detail in English literature previously.

Of the war, probably, but not necessarily for Midway. Tone's scout launching half an hour late (delaying finding the Americans) and the pure dumb luck of the Yorktown and Enterprise SBDs finding the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu when they did (fighters chasing the last TBDs, decks packed with strike two) are what I usually cite as the two deciding factors of the Battle, coupled with the work of Joe Rochefort's codebreaking crew beforehand.

Actually, the authors address this very point. They contend that it's one of the most cited myths ever....it's a story that originates from a single source (Cmdr. Fuchida's account) and that has been largely accepted as fact by Western historians. However Tully and Parshall look at the Japanese histories of the battle - where Fuchida's accounts are regarded as very flawed, and furthermore they detail how the timing of the entire search plane flotilla reports actually makes it likely a different float plane was the key one, not Tone's.

I was doubtful at first (I mistrust anything subtitled like this book is) but rapidly became convinced of the books historical rigor and detailed analysis....while remaining immensely readable and entertaining.

Gotta love 'em SBDs. After all, the Y-wing is based off of them.

Brilliant! You've connected why I love both - they're the same ship!!!

I believe I am now close to achieving total enlightenment, thanks to you YwingAce.

I heard about a damaging but not fatal torpedo hit to the Japanese flagship at Midway (At least I think it was Midway) turning into a killing blow because the ship had a novice damage control officer true? The way I heard it the ship had ignitable fuel fumes in the damaged section so he opened all of the vents trying to get rid of them. Instead they spread through the ship, a spark set them off, and the blast damaged the vessel beyond all hope of repair. I think the torpedo was from a submarine but I'm not certain.

Gotta love 'em SBDs. After all, the Y-wing is based off of them.

Brilliant! You've connected why I love both - they're the same ship!!!

I believe I am now close to achieving total enlightenment, thanks to you YwingAce.

Well, I do my best. :D

I heard about a damaging but not fatal torpedo hit to the Japanese flagship at Midway (At least I think it was Midway) turning into a killing blow because the ship had a novice damage control officer true? The way I heard it the ship had ignitable fuel fumes in the damaged section so he opened all of the vents trying to get rid of them. Instead they spread through the ship, a spark set them off, and the blast damaged the vessel beyond all hope of repair. I think the torpedo was from a submarine but I'm not certain.

That was the Taiho at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Great Marianas Turkey Shoot), 19 June, 1944. USS Albacore was the sub responsible.

Of the war, probably, but not necessarily for Midway. Tone's scout launching half an hour late (delaying finding the Americans) and the pure dumb luck of the Yorktown and Enterprise SBDs finding the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu when they did (fighters chasing the last TBDs, decks packed with strike two) are what I usually cite as the two deciding factors of the Battle, coupled with the work of Joe Rochefort's codebreaking crew beforehand.

Actually, the authors address this very point. They contend that it's one of the most cited myths ever....it's a story that originates from a single source (Cmdr. Fuchida's account) and that has been largely accepted as fact by Western historians. However Tully and Parshall look at the Japanese histories of the battle - where Fuchida's accounts are regarded as very flawed, and furthermore they detail how the timing of the entire search plane flotilla reports actually makes it likely a different float plane was the key one, not Tone's.

I was doubtful at first (I mistrust anything subtitled like this book is) but rapidly became convinced of the books historical rigor and detailed analysis....while remaining immensely readable and entertaining.

Fascinating. I'll look into this book. The Pacific War is my main areas of interest, so I'm always eager for new materials.

I heard about a damaging but not fatal torpedo hit to the Japanese flagship at Midway (At least I think it was Midway) turning into a killing blow because the ship had a novice damage control officer true? The way I heard it the ship had ignitable fuel fumes in the damaged section so he opened all of the vents trying to get rid of them. Instead they spread through the ship, a spark set them off, and the blast damaged the vessel beyond all hope of repair. I think the torpedo was from a submarine but I'm not certain.

That was the Taiho at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Great Marianas Turkey Shoot), 19 June, 1944. USS Albacore was the sub responsible.

Thanks I don't know why I was thinking Midway for that one.

I seem to recall reading that the japanese 'undercommited' the Yamoto because of the cult of personality of the emperor and they were terrified of it being sunk as it was so symbolic?

I know very little about the pacific war outside of chindit operations (about which i know probably far too much) so im sure someone more into naval us/japanese warfare can enlighten me.

I heard about a damaging but not fatal torpedo hit to the Japanese flagship at Midway (At least I think it was Midway) turning into a killing blow because the ship had a novice damage control officer true? The way I heard it the ship had ignitable fuel fumes in the damaged section so he opened all of the vents trying to get rid of them. Instead they spread through the ship, a spark set them off, and the blast damaged the vessel beyond all hope of repair. I think the torpedo was from a submarine but I'm not certain.

That was the Taiho at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Great Marianas Turkey Shoot), 19 June, 1944. USS Albacore was the sub responsible.

Thanks I don't know why I was thinking Midway for that one.

I believe Nautilus (not the nuke one!) took a pot shot at Kaga during Midway, but, as usual, her torpedoes failed to detonate.

I seem to recall reading that the japanese 'undercommited' the Yamoto because of the cult of personality of the emperor and they were terrified of it being sunk as it was so symbolic?

I know very little about the pacific war outside of chindit operations (about which i know probably far too much) so im sure someone more into naval us/japanese warfare can enlighten me.

All of the IJNs battlewagons were undercommitted, not just Yamato, partly because they were still clinging to the hope of a decisive big-gun naval engagement. Yamato, being the most powerful battleship, and named for Japan itself, was particularly held back because of the morale blow of losing a ship named for the country (see also Deutschland being renamed to Lutzow), and because the high command didn't want to risk losing her in some sideshow. After the loss of Hiei and Kirishima in November, 1942, they were even more reluctant to commit anything larger than destroyers to operations in the area, and the IJNs battleships sat out the next two years of the war in rear areas.

Yamamoto and his successors also appear to have had a bad habit of piece-meal commitment of reserves, as evidenced particularly in the Solomons campaign.

Cheers, that sort of back up what i remember reading.

Years ago i bought and painted a 'micro' scale japanes WWII fleet and a token US fleet in case i met anyone who didnt play so they could have my 'spare fleet' and *never* got round to actually ever playing a game which is a shame as it looked really nice all painted up.

I seem to recall painting the Lexington pretty well.

(admittently at that scale its mainly 'paint grey, drybrush light grey, paint funnels and guns )

Cool! Thanks to Parravon, I've started a 1/2400 IJN fleet, and am going to do a same-scale RN one next.

All of the IJNs battlewagons were undercommitted, not just Yamato, partly because they were still clinging to the hope of a decisive big-gun naval engagement. Yamato, being the most powerful battleship, and named for Japan itself, was particularly held back because of the morale blow of losing a ship named for the country (see also Deutschland being renamed to Lutzow), and because the high command didn't want to risk losing her in some sideshow. After the loss of Hiei and Kirishima in November, 1942, they were even more reluctant to commit anything larger than destroyers to operations in the area, and the IJNs battleships sat out the next two years of the war in rear areas.

Yamamoto and his successors also appear to have had a bad habit of piece-meal commitment of reserves, as evidenced particularly in the Solomons campaign.

Part of the reason may have been logistical - remember that the Japan was always oil-strapped. And when you consider that Yamato (one of the most fuel efficient BB's) at cruising speed burned the same amount of fuel as 15 DD's, it gives another reason to commit lighter units instead of heavier ones most of the time.

I love this discussion.

Part of the reason may have been logistical - remember that the Japan was always oil-strapped. And when you consider that Yamato (one of the most fuel efficient BB's) at cruising speed burned the same amount of fuel as 15 DD's, it gives another reason to commit lighter units instead of heavier ones most of the time.

I love this discussion.

From 1943, definitely. The oil situation wasn't bad in '41-'42, but once the tanker fleet started taking major casualties they had to start really conserving. They even pumped out some of the tanks of the sunken battleship Mutsu in July of '44.

The biggest problem any armed force, land air or naval, is going to have is supplying the fighting units. Japan overstretched in the Pacific and the US managed to cut away at the supply routes with their submarines. Germany had the war in Europe pretty much in the bag until they decided to take on Russia. It was the war on two fronts that crippled Germany. The Russian campaign wasn't supposed to last long and German forces were expected to be in Moscow before winter. Russian tenacity when fighting for the motherland was something the Germans never counted on and when the winter set in, the Germans were pretty much frozen in place. Roads turned to mud tracks that the German armour just couldn't move through.

A lot has been said about how great American equipment was. Their equipment was average at best. There was just lots of it. Japan was never going to last in a war of attrition with the US. The industrial might of the US far outstripped anything the Germans or Japanese could hope to match. That was probably the defining attribute that won the war for the Allies. By 1945 Britain, Russia and most of the countries of the British Commonwealth were using American made equipment from tanks, haltracks and trucks to aircraft. A prime example are the ships used to transport the war materials to Europe, the 14,500 ton Liberty ships. Initially they took 230 days to produce each one, but as mass production techniques improved the average production time was reduced to just 42 days, with one record setting case that went from keel-laying to launching in an unprecedented 4-1/2 days.

The German armoured vehicles were design-wise very good, but somewhat over engineered. Their passion for designing vehicles dedicated to a specific role led to so many variants of a tank chassis that it would have made any quartmaster's job a nightmare. But out of all that, they undoubtedly produced some of the finest vehicles of the war. The Panzer III-IV were very good for their time and out-performed British armour on many occasions. The Sturmgeschutze variant on the same chassis became a durable and dangerous vehicle that had great success when used as a tank destroyer instead of the infantry support gun it was supposed to be. Their standard Hanomag 251 halftracks were also well designed and served well in most theatres. The marriage of the 88mm gun with a tank chassis was inevitable, but the requirement of having the thickest armour possible made the Tiger too heavy and unwieldy. A lot of German shortcomings can be attributed to Hitler interfering with the design process by making unreasonable demands. His insistence that the Me262 be a high speed fighter bomber and not a pure interceptor led to delays in what could have been a very dangerous opponent for the RAF and USAAF late in the war. But this has been a standard throughout history with megalomaniacs. They love to meddle and make silly demands. It seems to be part of the job description.

Cutting the German and Japanese access to oil supplies was just part of the problems for the Axis. Day and night bombing of German manufacturing facilities would eventually cripple the Germans. Rubber was at a shortage, but so were many things required to keep producing fighting equipment. The Americans had the luxury of being out of range of German or Japanese bombing efforts and were capable of sustaining their factories with minimal need for imported commodities. Even today, the logistics required to keep a fighting force active is absolutely incredible. A modern division might encompass a few hundred fighting vehicles, but will quite often have 2-3 times that number in support vehicles. And they ALL need fuel.

Actually by 1945 UK domestic tank design was beginning to replace US designs.

We used US tanks mostly when we had bugger all in 43/44.

By 45 Cromwell was being produced at a fairly decent rate and replacing shermans where possible and equally where possible Challenger was replacing the British 'firefly' variant of the sherman (one of the few allied tanks capable of easily ruining a tigers day with a 17pdr AT gun roughly comparable to a PAK 88). sure there were a *lot* of American tanks and armoured vehicles in service still by 45 but domestic production was actually in full swing and we were relying a lot *less* on lend lease.

The problem UK armour had was a war department specification that tanks had to be movable by rail intact (very sensible) and unfortunately UK railway guage and the width of tunnels limited the width of the tank.

Tank width limits the size your turret ring allowing the turret to traverse, the size of the turret ring limits the size of gun you can put on a tank.

So essentially once we'd got over the ww1 'hangover' of the concept of 'infantry' and 'cruiser' tanks and realised after the battle of france that tanks essentially need to be designed to fight tanks primarily and anything else is a bonus we started making fairly decent tanks.

Comet entered service in 1945 and was phenominal tank (probably one of the best, if not *the* best in western allied service for its size/weight/gun/armour combo). In my personal collection I have photographs of 'centurion' being unloaded in Germany in the very last few days of the war for 'combat trials' (never saw any active service in wwii). Had the war in europe had gone on any longer centurion would undoutbaly been the best main battle tank in service in the war.

It was certainly the best tank of the 1950s.

I'd also argue that while Russia clearly kept accepting lend lease from their 'allies' (they clearly didnt trust the UK and US and called America the '2nd front') even when they no longer needed it that T34 production was pretty prolific and while some Shermans, valentines, matildas etc saw service with front line russian tank armies in the main they were used for driver training a *lot* and T34, KV1/2 were making up the mainstay by 44/45

Put it this way if you can make the T34/85 five times over for the cost of an early make 'tommy cooker/ronson' sherman why bother using them when the 34/85 is clearly a much better tank and much cheaper and much more reliable?

(A mate of mine was engaged by a T34/85 in the 1990s in the Balkans, they are still in service. This one wasnt in service for much longer as he was the gunner in a challenger II at the time )

Yup lend lease was phenominally important to the soviets and the empire but less so by 45. Critical in 42/43 though.

US Grant/Lee tanks were about the only thing we had in the desert that stood a chance against Rommel. our crusaders, vickers light tanks and the like were bloody awful.

The russians never liked the grant/lee. They always called it a 'coffin for seven brothers!'

Edit:

A pic from my private collection of WWII photos. A mk1 centurion being unloaded in Germany in 1945, it had a 20mm *coaxl*!

Also the first comets to arrive in Europe with 1 RTR

http://s91.photobucket.com/user/gadgeeuropa/media/DSC01552.jpg.html?sort=3&o=2387

Day and night bombing of German manufacturing facilities would eventually cripple the Germans.

The question of whether or not the various strategic bombing campaigns were ethical, effective, or a waste of resources is a question that could sustain discussion here for several weeks at least.

More often than not, the target wouldn't be hit, and residential areas would suffer instead. Precision was not great, but the effect on the morale of the victims was usually devastating.

More often than not, the target wouldn't be hit, and residential areas would suffer instead. Precision was not great, but the effect on the morale of the victims was usually devastating.

Many argue that it would have been more effective and more ethical to have redirected all the resources invested in strategic bombers into tactical air support instead. The loss rates would probably have been lower, and the results more effective. Politically however it would have subordinated the various air forces to Army operations. You can understand why the air arms of the U.S., UK, and even Germany, supported the idea of strategic bombing wholeheartedly.

The Luftwaffe was built around tactical ops, not strategic. One of the reasons they didn't do as well during the Battle of Britain as they had been in France.

I heard about a damaging but not fatal torpedo hit to the Japanese flagship at Midway (At least I think it was Midway) turning into a killing blow because the ship had a novice damage control officer true? The way I heard it the ship had ignitable fuel fumes in the damaged section so he opened all of the vents trying to get rid of them. Instead they spread through the ship, a spark set them off, and the blast damaged the vessel beyond all hope of repair. I think the torpedo was from a submarine but I'm not certain.

That was the Taiho at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Great Marianas Turkey Shoot), 19 June, 1944. USS Albacore was the sub responsible.

Thanks I don't know why I was thinking Midway for that one.

I believe Nautilus (not the nuke one!) took a pot shot at Kaga during Midway, but, as usual, her torpedoes failed to detonate.

I seem to recall reading that the japanese 'undercommited' the Yamoto because of the cult of personality of the emperor and they were terrified of it being sunk as it was so symbolic?

I know very little about the pacific war outside of chindit operations (about which i know probably far too much) so im sure someone more into naval us/japanese warfare can enlighten me.

All of the IJNs battlewagons were undercommitted, not just Yamato, partly because they were still clinging to the hope of a decisive big-gun naval engagement. Yamato, being the most powerful battleship, and named for Japan itself, was particularly held back because of the morale blow of losing a ship named for the country (see also Deutschland being renamed to Lutzow), and because the high command didn't want to risk losing her in some sideshow. After the loss of Hiei and Kirishima in November, 1942, they were even more reluctant to commit anything larger than destroyers to operations in the area, and the IJNs battleships sat out the next two years of the war in rear areas.

Yamamoto and his successors also appear to have had a bad habit of piece-meal commitment of reserves, as evidenced particularly in the Solomons campaign.

They did not sit out in 1944. In October the IJN set out to defend the Phillipine Islands incurring the largest naval battle in modern history, the Battle of Leyte Gulf. I will spare you the awesome details of this battle for a more anecdotal list of the more significant battleship actions which can be further explored through books.

• During October 25th, two Decisive surface engagements took place.

• The first took place beginning at 0200 in the Surgaio strait. This battle is also the final engagement ever to feature Battleships firing at each other. This USN victory featured 5 battleships that had been present during the Pearl Harbor raid, 3 of which had been sunk, raised, and refitted. The U.S. lost no battleship while the UJN lost a battleship and a heavy cruiser.

• The second decisive engagement took place off Samar where the IJN's Central force, featuring the Battlship Yamato caught an USN task force by surprise. In the ensuing engagement, which has been called the most lop-sided Naval engagement of all time in the history of the USN due to the fact that the US fleet consisted of 3 escort carriers, 4 Destroyers, 5 Destroyer Escorts and a couple of sea tenders vs a dense force of battleships, CAs, CLs, DDs, and Kamikazes, the small US force was able to TURN THE IJN FORCE due to swift, deliberate, and desperate violence of action. The U.S. Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts CHARGED THE IJN FLEET and caused such mass confusion by sweeping through the Japanese ranks that the Jspanese Commander ADM Kurita withdrew his fleet from action. The U.S. forces suffered 2 sunk CEs, 2 sunk DDs, 3 sunk DEs while the IJN lost 3 CAs (Heavy Cruisers).

•One of the Destroyers sunk, the USS Johnston, literally traded blows with the Yamato until the Johnston sunk. (Most of the batteries were knocked out by that time). As far as honor and gallantry go, the action off Samar had it in spades.

Minor corrections: Taffy 3 consisted of 6 CE's, 3 DD's, and 4 DE's. While the actions of the escort group played a large role in Kurita's decision, so did the fact that he was under continual air attack from Taffy 3's planes, as well as the planes from the 12 carriers of nearby Taffies 2 and 1. I think only one DE was sunk (Samuel B. Roberts).

I agree Johnston's story is one of the most moving of the war. Her captain, Lt. Cmdr Evans was awarded the Medal of Honor (posthumously) for his actions in the battle.

Great reads for the story: Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors

and

Little Ship, Big War (about Samuel B. Robert's sister ship, part of Taffy 2 that day)

Part of the allied bombing of germany was to be seen to be 'taking the war to the germans'

People wanted revenge for three years of being bombed and attacked.

UK bomber raids questionably ahieved little in the way of hitting targets but kept the British feeling they were 'fighting back'

Likewise commando raids *usually* did achieve a lot with a few early disasters as they again made the Uk populace feel they were attacking the germans on a weekly basis and caused the german to divert hundreds of thousands of reichmarks worth of men and material to extenisvely guarding the French coast

(then you have the advantage militarily of attacks on german radar (operation biting) and the failed attack on the heavy water plants (freshman) that later succeeded when doen on a smaller scale by SOE and the norwegians.

I'm always amazed the germans never raided the UK coast (or if they did they were never caught and never documented it), i'd have though it a perfect task for 'brandenburger' units.

UK mosquito bomber attacks were ridiculously cost effective. They could be into germany, drop a bomb on a particular building and be most ways out again before interceptors had chance to scramble. thats possibly a little unfair on the luftwaffe though as by the time mosquito raids were being made the luftwaffe was near non existent.

The luftwaffe themselves messed up the battle of britain by switching targets from airfields and radar stations to production facilities for no decent reason. The RAF was on its knees and two more days of hitting airfields would have finished them (still would never have been a seaborne invasion though, the Kriegsmarine told the OKW that they were not able to do it) but instead they switched to bombing aircraft factories and the like and let the RAF recover.

Perhaps the biggest problem the Germans have after 'logistics' (and i always say 'super soldiers and super weapons dont win wars, being able to feed men and load weapons and move them about does) was the political infighting.

Consider that Himmler, Goering and Hitler's army generals all had their own 'private empires'. They were all hoarding resources and hiding them from each other. Plane building programmes were stalled because of a shortage of aluminum, aluminum that would later be found hidden away by another department in case they needed it later.

Likewise when the luftwaffe was seriously depleted in planes Goering still kept *thousands* of able bodied men in the air force rather than transfer them to the army and made entire 'luftwaffe field divisions' (which were of a poor quality as infantry) rather than surrender 'his' men to the army or SS for retraining and redeployment under decent leaders.

I think in 1943 the field divisions (called my the germans 'mistakenly formed field divisions') were put under army control to try and stop the hideous waste of men as the russians would get scouts to work out which sectors were held by field divisions (or poorly motivated allies like Romanians) and hit them really hard to break through but by this point it was too late.

Certainly even in normandy there were field division units fighting in the hedgerows.

All of this above BTW is a *good* thing, i make no 'apologies' for the defeat of fascism, im just so glad it was ego centric and incompetent. If they had been run properly the world could have been a fairly horrible place.